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elements of the basal ganglia (Graybiel, 1998). The striatum, the 
primary input structure of the basal ganglia, is widely believed to 
function in procedural learning and in selecting among candidate 
movements, strategies, and interpretations of sensory information 
on the basis of prior success and failure (Graybiel, 1991, 2008; 
Schultz, 1998; Wilson, 2004). Dopamine released in the striatum by 
terminals of midbrain dopamine-containing neurons is thought to 
convey a reward prediction error signal (Schultz et al., 1997; Schultz, 
1998), and dopamine-dependent long-term synaptic plasticity at 
 corticostriatal synapses has been proposed as the basis for reinforce-
ment learning (RL; Montague et al., 1996; Reynolds et al., 2001).
A key difficulty for a modular computational system is how 
to achieve the learning of a specialized function by each module. 
This problem has been addressed computationally, and it has been 
proposed that modular “responsibility signals” can properly control 
switching and permit modular RL (Wolpert and Kawato, 1998; 
Haruno et al., 2001; Doya et al., 2002). Here, we present a model 
of modular RL in which modules are selected on the basis of their 
relevance to the environment. The well-established anatomical 
modularity of the striatum suggests itself as a plausible substrate 
for a functional modularity of the kind expressed in our model. We 
IntroductIon
In a complex and uncertain world, how do we learn and select 
behaviors appropriately? Rather than learning behavioral pat-
terns de novo each time our environment changes, we often select 
previously acquired behavioral patterns, and add new behavioral 
elements to the previously acquired set, depending on the situa-
tion. Learning is often context-dependent: when we are at work, 
we are in a different configuration than we are when at home, at 
the store, or on the road, and we learn to activate a different set 
of behaviors in each context. To accomplish multiple functions 
in a changing environment, reorganization of previously learned 
behavioral patterns tends to be more efficient than learning entirely 
new behaviors. The essence of this reorganization is the switching 
of existing behavioral modules.
In computational neuroscience, such an integration of special-
ized functions can be achieved by a so-called “mixture of experts” 
learning architecture, which consists of parallel and distributed 
learning modules (Jacobs et al., 1991; Jordan and Jacobs, 1994), 
and it has been suggested that this learning architecture closely 
resembles the anatomical organization of cortico-basal ganglia 
circuits connecting the neocortex with the striatum and other 
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doi: 10.3389/fnhum.2011.00047represents the value of each state, st. There are two “decisions” that 
the model must make. Firstly, it must decide which module to select, 
based on its knowledge of the environment. Secondly, the chosen 
module must decide which action to choose, based on the value 
of each action. This structure allows the model to specialize its 
modules for various environments or contexts, so that the agent can 
rapidly switch strategies in a changing world. For the action selec-
tion policy, we adopted the softmax rule, which assigns the prob-
ability of choosing each candidate action as: πm(s, a) = exp(βQm(s, 
a))/Σa′exp(βQm(s, a′)), where β > 0 is a parameter controlling the 
randomness of the choices.
For module selection, we have adopted the responsibility signal, 
λm(t), which represents how well the module’s prediction model 
predicts the environment (Wolpert and Kawato, 1998; Haruno 
et al., 2001; Doya et al., 2002). The prediction model (predictor) 
of module m receives the current state, st, as its input and generates 
a prediction of a certain feature of the environment as  yp s t
mm
t = () . 
For simplicity, we adopt the reward received (Rt = 1 or Rt = 0) as 
the feature of the environment that the prediction model must 
predict. The selection of each module is based on how well the 
predictor in the module predicts the environment. Therefore, the 
criterion for the predictor of module m is proportional to the log 
likelihood. The log likelihood can be written as  −∑ ∆ = 12
2
1
2 /( )( ), σ i
t
i
m  
where σ is the standard deviation (SD) of the additive Gaussian 
noise and ∆i
m is the prediction error (( )). ∆= − i
m
i
m
i Rp s  We further 
assume that the importance of the error decays temporally. We 
thus define the temporal accumulation of the log likelihood as 
Γ∆
m
i
t
i
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2 στ  which is the 
discuss the possibility that clustered striosome–matrisome domains 
may form a critical part of such modules; that striosomes may 
assign the modular responsibility signals; and that interneurons, 
especially cholinergic interneurons and somatostatin-containing 
low-threshold spiking (LTS) interneurons, may convey these 
responsibility signals to matrisomes. Such signaling by striosomes 
and interneurons could permit both the modularization of learn-
ing and the efficient switching of behaviors in order to adapt to a 
changing environment. Thus, we hypothesize that computation of 
modular responsibility signals by the striosomes may contribute to 
the functional specialization of matrisomes that comprise a mixture 
of experts. In our proposed model, the responsibility signal for 
each modular striatal domain is calculated based on temporally 
decaying accumulated errors in the prediction of features of the 
environment.
Each striatal domain, thus conceived, is seen to be important 
for conveying responsibility signals, modulating learning, and 
assigning action value. In addition, the actual selection of actions 
from a set of candidate actions is likely to involve larger basal     
ganglia-thalamo-cortical modules in which the striatal modules are 
embedded and which the striatal modules set up by their afferent 
and efferent connections. We constructed a simple network model 
of the cortico-basal ganglia-thalamo-cortical loop, including the 
direct and indirect pathways through the basal ganglia, in order to 
examine how this neural architecture might influence module and 
action selection. Remarkably, this model suggested that selecting 
actions could be represented in the direct pathway, whereas select-
ing behavioral modules (i.e., the sets of actions appropriate to a 
given environmental context) could be represented in the indirect 
pathway. We propose that basal ganglia-thalamo-cortical modules 
may be selected on the basis of responsibility signals within their 
embedded striatal modules. Such basal ganglia-thalamo-cortical 
modules may then select an action from among the set of candi-
date actions corresponding to a behavioral module. We consider 
the plausibility of the proposed models based on anatomical and 
physiological evidence.
computatIonal models
modular reInforcement learnIng model
In order to identify the functional properties of modular RL and 
investigate the requirements to embody it in the nervous system, 
we first develop a simple modular RL model.
Description of modular reinforcement learning model
We begin by introducing a simple RL module that learns actions 
appropriate to a given context (Figure 1). Each module contains 
a set of action selection policies updated by an RL architecture 
(Sutton and Barto, 1998; Doya et al., 2002). The model uses a 
Markov decision process in which state is s (e.g., the location of 
the agent, s = 1–14 in our simulation), action is a (e.g., moving 
right or left in our simulation), and immediate reward is Rt at time 
t. Each RL module m consists of an action-value function Qm(s, a) 
that represents the value of an action taken from a specific state st, 
and a prediction model, which generates a prediction of a certain 
feature of the environment based on the state st of the agent (e.g., 
whether there is reward or not at state st in our simulation). For 
each module, we also introduce a state value function Vm(s), which 
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Figure 1 | Schematic diagram of modular reinforcement learning (rL) 
model. Each module m produces a responsibility λm and a policy πm. 
Responsibility λm is calculated based on the accumulated squared prediction 
error Γm, which in turn is based on a comparison of a prediction pm of a feature 
of the environment with the actual feature (in this case the reward Rt). The 
module with greater λm is selected based on the softmax selection rule r, 
which can be seen as a description of a gating network. The modular policy πm 
assigns each module’s probability of choosing each candidate action based on 
the modular action-value function Qm. The policy πm of the selected module 
determines the actual action at. The learning or updating of pm and Qm is 
performed only within the selected module using the global reward signal Rt.
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as δγ t
m
t
m
t
m
t RV sV s =+ − − () () , 1  where γ is the temporal discount 
factor, which controls how much influence is exerted by rewards 
successively farther in the future. The state value is updated by 
the TD error as Vs Vs t
m
tt
m
tt
m
+ =+ 1() () , φδ  where φ (0 < φ < 1) is the 
learning rate of the state value. The action-value function is updated 
as Qs aQ sa t
m
tt
m
tt
m
+ =+ 1(,)( ,) , κδ  where κ (0 < κ < 1) is the learning 
rate of the action value. In each trial, the state and action-value 
functions are updated only in the selected module.
Computational simulation of modular reinforcement learning
To demonstrate how the model works, we constructed a toy exam-
ple of RL (Figure 2). The agent exists in a one-dimensional grid 
world, in which the only action choices are “go left” or “go right.” 
This environment has a starting position and several positions to 
the left and to the right of the starting position. The agent can 
inhabit either of two versions of the environment. One version 
has a reward at the end position on one side, whereas the other 
version has a reward at the end position on the other side. This 
reward location is switched after every 2500 time steps. When the 
agent reaches an end position (s = 1 or s = 14) not containing a 
reward, it is bounced one position back (s = 2 or 13). If the agent 
obtains reward, it is returned back to the center position (s = 7). 
For simplicity, we fixed the standard RL parameters to standard 
values: β = 1, γ = 0.8, and ϕ = κ = 0.1 (cf. Sutton and Barto, 1998). 
We set the newly introduced modular RL parameters to α = 20, 
σ = 1, τ = 10, and η = 0.05.
The predictor in each module aims to predict the probability that 
a given position yields a reward. When the simulation begins, the two 
predictors have no prior experience on which to base their predictions; 
therefore, they both predict that each position has an equal probability 
(P = 1/14) of containing a reward. The action-value functions also 
give an equal action value of moving right or left from any position. 
sum of squared prediction errors, weighted such that prediction 
errors in the past become less important than more recent ones. 
Parameter τ is the time constant that characterizes the tempo-
ral decay of Γm(t), and H(s) is a step function (H(s) = 1 when 
s ≥ 0, and H(s) = 0 when s < 0). We define the likelihood value 
λm(t) = exp(Γm(t)) as the responsibility of module m, as it represents 
the goodness of prediction of module m. We further normalize the 
responsibility λm ← λm/Σmλm in order to describe it as a probability. 
Based on the softmax selection rule, the probability of choosing 
module m is rm = exp(αλm(t))/Σnexp(αλn(t)), where α (α > 0) is 
a parameter controlling the randomness of the module selection. 
According to this equation, a module with a greater responsibility 
has a greater probability of being selected than do other modules. 
This architecture can be seen as a gating network that selects a 
module based on the set of calculated modular responsibility sig-
nals and thereby permits the selection of an action appropriate to 
the environment. Each module produces a policy πt
m sa (, ), which 
determines a candidate action. In the original idea of a mixture of 
experts, the output policy was the sum of policies weighted by their 
respective responsibilities. However, for simplicity, in the follow-
ing simulation only the candidate action in the selected module 
becomes an actual action.
Learning signals for both the predictor () ∆t
m  and the action and 
state value functions (δt
m) are calculated from the immediate reward 
signal Rt. Importantly, because the error is produced only by the 
selected module, the learning should occur only in the selected 
module. The prediction model can be updated based on the predic-
tion error () ∆t
m  as ps ps t
m
tt
m
ti
m
+ =+ 1() () , η∆  where η (0 < η < 1) is the 
learning rate of the predictor and m is the selected module. This 
formulation says that the prediction is adjusted according to the 
discrepancy between the prediction and the actual reward received. 
This is further normalized:  ps ps ps t
m
tt
m
ts
m
++ ←∑ 11 () () /( )  to express 
it as a probability. The action and state value functions are updated 
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Figure 2 | Dynamically changing grid world explored by modular rL model. 
The agent (circle) can move either left or right, and when the agent receives reward, 
it is returned to the center (s = 7). The reward is placed at either s = 1 or s = 14, and 
this location alternates every 2500 time steps. When the agent reaches the 
unrewarded terminal, it is moved one position back (from s = 14 to s = 13 in Env. B 
and from s = 1 to s = 2 in Env. A). Each of the model’s two modules becomes 
specialized by modular RL to maximize the agent’s accumulated reward in one of 
the two versions of the environment (Env. A and Env. B) defined by reward location.
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While tremendously simplified, this starting condition corresponds 
to the starting condition of a human or other animal exploring a 
novel environment for the first time, with no knowledge of the states 
required to obtain rewards in the environment or of actions required 
to reach those states. The agent must explore the environment in order 
to learn the reward structure of the environment.
When the model begins training, neither module is better suited 
to the environment: the selection is made randomly, with equal 
probability. Moreover, the selected module does not know which 
strategy to use, i.e., whether to move right or left from each posi-
tion. By the end of training, the model selects a module that has 
become specialized for the environmental context, in that it makes 
the correct choices to receive rewards.
How does this specialization of modules occur? Again, the model 
initially selects the module at random. The selected module initially 
selects the direction of the steps randomly, with equal probability. 
Thus, module selection oscillates and the agent makes a random 
walk, stepping sometimes left, sometimes right, until by chance it 
reaches the reward. This reward was unpredicted by the selected 
module’s predictor, but now the predictor knows that reward is 
more likely at that location. As this process repeats in a single envi-
ronment, the predictors of both modules learn to predict reward 
at the same location.
Suppose, however, that we now change the environment: now 
the reward is given in position 1 instead of 14, and the prediction 
error of the predictors increases. As the process of module and 
action selection continues, by chance, one of the modules (say B) 
has slightly more experiences in this new environment than the 
other module has. This improves its prediction signals, decreases 
its prediction error, increases its responsibility signal, and increases 
the probability that module B will be selected. Eventually, module 
B is selected exclusively, and it becomes specialized for this envi-
ronment: not only does it make accurate reward predictions, but 
it has developed a set of appropriate action values for each state 
(position), which permit the model to make choices that reliably 
guide it to the reward.
If we now change the environment back to its previous version 
by switching the reward back to position 14, the prediction error 
of module B goes up and the model switches to module A. Over 
many trials, module A becomes increasingly specialized for this 
version of the environment. While module A learns this version 
of the environment, module B is not trained and consequently 
remains specialized for the previous version of the environment.
Figure 3A shows the action-value function of each module. 
Module A learns to choose rightward movements, and module 
B learns to choose leftward movements. Figure 3B illustrates the 
prediction of each module, which is updated over time. The learn-
ing of predictions is faster than that of action values. Because the 
selected module is switched if the prediction model produces an 
error, different prediction models tend to update their values in 
different environments, and hence, the prediction models tend to 
produce different predictions. Figure 4A shows the responsibility 
of each module as a function of time; as a result of learning, the 
responsibility of each module changes depending on the environ-
ment. As we can see in Figure 4B, the temporal dynamics of the dif-
ference of  responsibilities, λB − λA, follows the location of the reward 
(which changes depending on the environment). Correspondingly, 
the model learns to select one of the modules (Figure 4C) and move 
in the direction of the rewarded terminal (Figure 4D) consistently 
in each environment.
The model’s learning is robust to changes of parameters. We 
fixed the standard RL parameters to standard values (Sutton and 
Barto, 1998; see above) and examined the robustness of the model’s 
learning by varying the newly introduced modular RL parameters. 
Over a wide range of values, the SD σ and decay time constant τ 
of the temporal accumulation of the log likelihood are not critical 
factors for the model’s ability to learn. However, extremely large 
σ or small τ cause the responsibility signal λ to decay too rapidly. 
We thus set them to σ = 1 and τ = 10.
The learning ability of the agent is critically dependent on the 
randomness of module switching α. If α ∼ β, the modular selec-
tion becomes too random and the agent fails to learn properly. 
The model is able to learn when α > β and to learn stably with 
α = 10 ∼ 1010 when we set η = 0.05. However, when α becomes 
very large, the model is unable to switch modules and thus has 
to learn with a single module. The learning rate of the predictor 
η also affects the learning ability. If η is too large, the respon-
sibility value λ decays too rapidly. If η is too small, prediction 
errors following an environmental change cannot produce large 
enough changes in λ, causing the agent to fail to shift modules. 
The agent could learn properly between η = 0.01 and η = 0.3 
when we set α = 20.
Lastly we examined the advantages of the modular architec-
ture compared to normal RL. With α → ∞, the agent cannot shift 
modules and thus is equivalent to standard, non-modular RL. In 
this case, the model has to relearn every time the environment 
is changed. Figure 4E shows the time course of the location of 
the agent with the parameters given above (α = 20, η = 0.05, 
σ = 1, τ = 10, β = 1, γ = 0.8, and ϕ = κ = 0.1). In this grid world 
(Figure 2), when the agent obtains a reward at one terminal, the 
agent is returned back to the center. At the unrewarded terminal, 
the agent is simply pushed one grid position back. As a result of 
this asymmetry, the agent is more likely to be in the side opposite 
to the rewarded terminal. Our simulation confirms that, even in 
this difficult situation, the modular RL architecture could detect 
the changing of the environment and could pursue the reward 
appropriately, while the normal RL could not.
The modular RL architecture allows the model to shift modules 
following the change of environment. The number of time steps 
required for a shift of module was only about 30–50. Figure 4F 
shows the time course of the location of the agent that cannot shift 
modules (α → ∞). With single-module RL, the agent is trapped 
in the unrewarded terminal. Thus the agent can receive reward in 
only one environment in this case.
network model
In our modular RL model, a gating network (Jacobs et al., 1991) 
compares the responsibility signals of all the modules and selects 
one of them (Doya et al., 2002). The neural mechanisms underlying 
this gating network are still a matter of debate. As a step toward 
understanding how the basal ganglia circuitry might accomplish 
module selection, we created a simple network model of the cortico-
basal ganglia-thalamo-cortical circuit. The novel hypothesis that 
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sentations, in contrast to the gross convergence seen, for example, 
at the striatonigral projection (Kaneda et al., 2002). By contrast, the 
direct pathway might transmit specific action-value information 
(as well as module information) to the thalamus, where it could 
influence cortical action selection. This hypothesis, which emerged 
from the model, is similar to the idea of selection and inhibition 
of competing motor programs proposed by Mink (1996), with the 
additional feature that in our model, selection and inhibition by the 
indirect pathway occur within a modular framework set up by the 
striosome–matrisome architecture of the striatum: modular sets of 
contextually inappropriate candidate actions are inhibited by the 
indirect pathway. One of the candidate actions in an uninhibited 
(i.e., selected) module is favored by the direct pathway.
Figure 5 summarizes the connectivity of our network model. 
The input and output regions of the neocortex could correspond, 
for example, to premotor and motor cortices, respectively, or 
to prefrontal and premotor cortices. The input cortex projects 
to the output cortex both directly and indirectly via the cor-
tico-basal ganglia-thalamo-cortical pathway. Also included in 
Figure 5 are several components that are implicit in our network 
model: striosomes, which are assumed to send   responsibility 
emerged from this network modeling is that the indirect pathway 
could serve as the gating network, facilitating or suppressing mod-
ules on the basis of striatal responsibility signals.
Our network model is essentially a set of potential mechanisms 
by which striatal responsibility signals and the direct and indirect 
basal ganglia pathways could function in module and action selec-
tion. The network model augments our RL model by suggesting 
more detailed and biologically plausible mechanisms for these proc-
esses. The indirect pathway could contribute to module selection by 
enhancing the differences in activation of modules already present 
in the striatum. Unlike our modular RL model, our network model 
at this stage does not attempt to simulate learning and it does not 
include prediction models, prediction errors, TD errors, or state 
value functions. An important area for future research is how the 
corticostriosomal network could learn to make predictions for 
computing responsibility signals.
As a simple first step to illustrate the potential function of the 
indirect pathway in modular gating, we explore the idea that conver-
gence of connections at a fine level along the indirect pathway could 
blur the distinctions between adjacent action-value representations 
within each striatal module, thus making the indirect pathway well 
suited to module selection rather than action  selection. The required 
-1
0
1
2
3
0
1
2
3
T
i
m
e
AB
Q(left,s)
Module A
Q
v
a
l
u
e
Q
v
a
l
u
e
P
r
e
d
i
c
t
i
o
n
 
(
P
)
Q(right,s)
-1
0
1
2
3
0
1
2
3
T
i
m
e
T
i
m
e
Q(left,s)
Module B
Q(right,s)
0
1
2
3
1
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
T
i
m
e
Module A
Prediction
State(s) State(s) State(s)
State(s)S tate(s)
2 7
State(s)
State(s) State(s)
Module B
Module AM odule B
S
t
a
t
e
 
V
a
l
u
e
 
(
V
)
 
0
1
2
3
State Value
x 104 x 104
x 104 x 104
13 2 71 3 2 71 3 2 71 3
2 71 3 2 71 3 2 71 3 2 71 3
Figure 3 | Action value, prediction, and state value functions of the two 
modules as the model learns in two versions of the environment. The 
reward location alternates every 2500 time steps. Columns represent different 
locations. States (locations) 2 through 13 are shown; terminal locations are 
omitted. (A) Action value (Q) as a function of state and time. Top two panels 
represent the action-value function of module A and bottom two panels 
represent that of module B. Left panels show the values for leftward movements 
and right panels show the values for rightward movements. After training, 
module A selectively prefers rightward movements and module B selectively 
prefers leftward movements. (B) Prediction and state value functions of each 
module. Top two panels represent the prediction (P) of each module. Bottom two 
panels represent the state value function (V) of each module. Left panels show 
the functions for module A and right panels show the functions for module B. 
After training, module A predicts that the reward is likely to be obtained in the 
rightmost position and assigns the rightmost position the highest state value, 
while module B makes these assignments for the leftmost position.
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Figure 4 | Module responsibility, module selection, and preferred location 
follow changes in environment. (A) Responsibility signals of module B (red) 
and module A (blue) as functions of time. (B) Difference of responsibility signals, 
λB − λA, (green line) plotted with the changing environment (Env. A or B; red). 
Positive differences imply greater module B responsibility, whereas negative 
differences imply greater module A responsibility. (C) Selected module (blue) 
and environment (red) as functions of time. In environment A (Env. A), reward is 
located at s = 1. In environment B (Env. B), reward is located at s = 14. Modules 
switch rapidly at first and then follow changes in environment. (D) Location of 
the agent as a function of time late in training, from time 27350 to time 27650 
(green line). Blue line indicates location smoothed with a moving average with 
window of width 100. Red circles indicate the times and locations at which the 
agent obtained the reward. Environment changes from Env. B to Env. A at time 
27500 (dashed line). The module switches from B to A around 27530. (e) 
Location of the agent as a function of time for the entire training period. Symbols 
are as in (D). After learning, the agent can obtain rewards in either terminal, 
depending on the environment. (F) Failure of learning of normal, non-modular 
RL. In this case, the model learns to obtain rewards only at s = 14.
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the action-value signals of D1 MSNs are then sent to the globus 
pallidus internal segment/substantia nigra pars compacta (GPi/
SNr), where these signals are integrated with modular gating signals 
from the indirect pathway derived from the effect of responsibility 
signals on the activity of D2 MSNs. These modular gating signals 
enhance differences in the activation of modules at the level of GPi/
SNr and can be compared to rm in our RL model. The GPi/SNr 
signal is then passed on to the thalamus and thence to the output 
cortex, where this signal is used to select an action.
The key assumption that we introduce here is that the connec-
tivity of both the direct pathway and the indirect pathway is topo-
graphical and convergent at a fine level corresponding to modular 
sets of action-value representations. Although the degree of topog-
raphy of the basal ganglia at this fine level is unknown, it is known 
that most structures of the cortico-basal   ganglia-  thalamo-cortical 
signals to medium spiny projections neurons (MSNs) in the 
matrix within the same module; evaluation cortex, which is 
assumed to send signals related to responsibility to striosomes; 
the substantia nigra pars compacta (SNc)/ventral tegmental area 
(VTA), which is assumed to be the source of dopamine signals; 
and behavioral output.
The input cortex is assumed to contain action value-related 
signals, related to Qm(s, a) in the RL model, before modulation 
by responsibility signals in the striatum. In the present model, for 
simplicity, we represent the action value-related signals for actions a 
and b as the firing probability of two representative neurons in the 
input cortex. The cortical neurons send one-to-one connections to 
specific D1 and D2 dopamine receptor-containing matrix MSNs 
(D1 and D2 MSNs) in two striatal modules. The firing probabilities 
of direct- and indirect-pathway MSNs represent action values dif-
ferentially modulated by responsibility signals; these  responsibility 
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Figure 5 | Schematic diagram of cortico-basal ganglia-thalamo-cortical 
network model. Red arrows and “(+)” indicate excitatory glutamatergic 
projections, blue arrows and “(−)” indicate inhibitory GABAergic projections, 
burgundy arrows indicate modulatory connections, i.e., responsibility signals and 
dopamine signals. Responsibility signals could potentially be conveyed from 
striosomes by cholinergic interneurons (ACh), and could modulate dopamine 
signals (DA) reaching D1 and D2 medium spiny neurons (MSNs) from the SNc/
VTA (not explicitly included in our computational model). In addition to its input 
from the thalamus, the output region of the neocortex receives inputs from the 
input region of the neocortex and has self-feedback connections. “a” and “b” 
represent actions and action-related signals (e.g., action-value or action-selection 
signals), and “A” and “B” represent modules. “D1” and “D2” represent 
direct-pathway, D1-expressing matrix MSNs and their projections and 
indirect-pathway, D2-expressing matrix MSNs and their projections, respectively. 
In the model striatum, matrix MSNs can be in either module, express D1 or D2 
dopamine receptors, and represent multiple action values. The evaluation cortex 
(also not explicitly included in our computational model) is assumed to send 
signals related to responsibility to striosomes. The responsibility signals then 
influence action-value representations of matrix MSNs. Both direct and indirect 
pathways in the model are topographical and convergent at a fine level 
corresponding to action-value representations. GPe, globus pallidus external 
segment; STN, subthalamic nucleus; GPi/SNr, globus pallidus internal segment/
substantia nigra pars reticulata; SNc/VTA, substantia nigra pars compacta/ventral 
tegmental area; D1 and D2, D1 and D2 MSNs; ACh, acetylcholine; DA, dopamine.
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ways through the whole loop system (Alexander et al., 1986). For 
example, the primary and supplementary motor areas, the senso-
rimotor striatum, the internal and external segments of the glo-
bus pallidus (GPi and GPe, respectively), the subthalamic nucleus 
(STN), and the thalamus in monkeys all contain somatotopic maps 
(Romanelli et al., 2005). It is within this more general topographic 
framework that the fine-scale patterns of differential convergence 
occur in our model (Flaherty and Graybiel, 1991, 1994; Graybiel 
et al., 1994). Based on this organization, we assume that the rep-
resented information is topographically preserved in each station 
of the cortico-basal ganglia loop. In the model, topographically 
mapped neurons in each structure represent different actions 
(action values in the striatum, motor signals in the output cortex).
The different functions of the two pathways in our model 
depend on a hypothetical higher degree of blurring of adjacent 
action-value representations within modules in the indirect path-
way than in the direct pathway. The relative degree of convergence 
of connections in the direct and indirect pathways at this fine level 
is actually not fully established experimentally. However, we found 
that this difference emerges naturally if we simply assume that the 
convergent pattern of connections (Gaussian projection function) 
to each nucleus from its afferent nucleus is similar, but that the level 
of blurring of action-value information is enhanced in the indirect 
pathway by virtue of the two steps of projection in which a larger 
nucleus projects to a smaller one. Although these assumptions are 
clearly simplistic, they are a useful starting point for a first explora-
tion of the hypothesis of modular gating by the indirect pathway.
The sizes of the nuclei become progressively smaller along the 
pathways leading from the striatum to the GPi/SNr, or from the 
striatum to the GPe and then to the STN (Oorschot, 1996). This 
fact could result in a progressive coarsening of the resolution of rep-
resented information along these pathways (Bar-Gad et al., 2003), 
long hypothesized as a “funneling” process (Percheron and Filion, 
1991; Bolam et al., 1993; Parent and Hazrati, 1995). The degree of 
coarsening is likely to depend partly on the relative numbers of 
neurons in the pre- and postsynaptic nuclei.
The connectivity of the basal ganglia is known to be far more 
complex than we take into account here. For example, the path-
ways from the neocortex to the striatal matrix, and then to GPe 
and GPi, have, at least in part, a divergence–reconvergence archi-
tecture (Flaherty and Graybiel, 1994). The GPe not only projects 
to the STN, but also projects back to the striatum, preferentially 
targeting parvalbumin-containing and somatostatin- (and nitric 
oxide synthase-) containing interneurons that in turn influence 
striatal circuitry (Bevan et al., 1998). The STN not only receives 
input from the GPe and sends output to the GPi, but also receives 
input from the neocortex and has multiple outputs (Jackson and 
Crossman, 1981; Kita and Kitai, 1987; Bolam et al., 2000; Degos 
et al., 2008). We do not consider the ventral striatum and the ventral 
pallidum, which have extensive interconnections with key basal 
ganglia-related pathways (Bevan et al., 1996, 1997). In order to focus 
our attention on the idea of blurring or coarsening of resolution 
at the level of action-related representations, we have simplified 
the connectivity of our model to include only the classical direct- 
and indirect-pathway connections. The omitted connections are 
consistent with this core idea.
Description of network model
The membrane potential of a spiking neuron i can be modeled as 
vt wu tt ij
N
ij f
nt
j
f j () () ,
() =∑ ∑−  where N is the number of connections 
received from neuron j, nj(t) is the number of spikes generated in 
neuron j until time t, wij is the synaptic efficacy, and t j
f is the time at 
which the f-th spike arrives from neuron j. For the response func-
tion, we adopted an exponentially decaying function u(s) = (1/τ)
exp(−s/τ)H(s), where H(s) is a step function (H(s) = 1 when s ≥ 0, 
and H(s) = 0 when s < 0). For simplicity of modeling, we assume that 
the spike sequence can be modeled as an inhomogeneous Poisson 
process (Amemori and Ishii, 2001); thus the sample mean of the 
membrane potential becomes vt wu ts sd s ij
N
ij
t
j () () () , =∑ ∫− =10 λ  
where λj(t) is the firing frequency of neuron j. We further assume 
that the variance of the membrane potential is constant and that 
the output firing frequency of a neuron can be modeled by a sig-
moid activation function: λi(t) = 1/(1 + exp(α(vi(t) − θ))). We 
scaled the firing threshold θ by the baseline membrane potential r 
as θ = βr. Thus the parameters α, β, and τ determine the activity 
characteristics of each region, whereas the connectivity between 
regions is determined by wij.
In the model, a neuron in the target structure receives its strong-
est connection from the center of the topographically correspond-
ing region in the structure of origin and progressively weaker 
input from neurons farther from the center. To implement this 
topographical organization and convergence, we apply a Gaussian 
projection function, wi j ij =− − ωσ πσ /( )exp(( )/ ( )), 22
22  where j is 
the neuronal index of the neuron in the structure of origin (size M), 
and i is the neuronal index of the target structure (size N). To main-
tain topography despite differences in the sizes of the structures, 
the indices are resized as i = [Nj/M] when M > N, and j = [Mi/N] 
when M < N. The parameter σ is the SD of the projection func-
tion and the parameter ω controls the strength of influence of the 
presynaptic neurons on the postsynaptic neurons. When the input 
is inhibitory, ω is negative. We set σ = 3, in units of neurons. The 
Gaussian function applies to every projection in the model except 
for the corticostriatal and corticocortical projections. In these latter 
two projections, the connections are one-to-one: wij = ω for i = j, 
and wij = 0 otherwise.
We used the data of Oorschot (1996) as a very rough guide to the 
relative sizes of our model basal ganglia, but the relative differences 
between nuclei are smaller in our model than in the actual basal 
ganglia. The size of the model striatum is set to 600: it contains 300 
D1 MSNs and 300 D2 MSNs. The size of the input region of the 
cerebral cortex is also 300, the size of GPe is 100, the size of STN is 
25, the size of GPi/SNr is 50, the size of the thalamus is 200, and the 
size of the output region of the cortex is set to 200. For the input 
region of the cortex and for the striatum, we set α = 1, θ = 2, and 
τ = 20. For GPe, we set α = 1, β = 1.12, and τ= 10. For STN we set 
α = 5, β = 1.05, and τ = 20. For GPi/SNr, we set α = 1, β = 1.11, 
and τ = 10. For the thalamus, we set α = 0.5, β = 1.6, and τ= 10. 
For the output region of the cortex, we set α = 18, β = 1.08, and 
τ= 20. For the projection from the striatum to GPe, we set ω = −1. 
For GPe to STN, we set ω = −0.3. For the striatum to GPi/SNr, we 
set ω = −1.2. For STN to GPi/SNr, we set ω = 0.5. For GPi/SNr 
to thalamus, we set ω = −3.0. For the input region to the output 
region of the cortex, we set ω = 2.4. For the thalamus to the output 
region of the cortex, we set ω = 8. In order to maintain sustained 
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thus promoting its selection), while the activity of each D2 MSN 
ultimately contributes to the inhibition of contextually inappropri-
ate modular sets of actions.
The model striatum contains two modules: module A, con-
taining the first half of the MSNs according to their index, and 
module B, containing the second half. Each module contains 150 
pairs of D1 and D2 MSNs. We assume that the two modules are 
differentially modulated by different responsibility signals even 
while receiving the same input from the input cortex and the 
same phasic dopamine signal. To illustrate module selection by 
the model, we generate identical cortical activity patterns at two 
different times (Figure 6A, left). At the first time, striatal module B 
is influenced by a responsibility signal (Figure 6A, middle); at the 
second time, striatal module A is influenced instead (Figure 6A, 
right). Based on the possibility that these positive responsibility 
signals may involve an increase in phasic local striatal dopamine 
activity of the selected neuron, for the output region of the cortex 
we assume that each neuron has a self-feedback connection. The 
strength of self-feedback was set to ω = 0.55.
Results of the network simulation
In the model, the level of activity in matrix MSNs in each striatal 
module is controlled by two factors: (1) the strength of the modular 
responsibility signals, which determines the relative excitability of 
matrix MSNs in different striatal modules, and (2) the level of 
activity of afferent cortical neurons, which determines the relative 
activity levels of matrix MSNs within a module. We assume that the 
excitability of D1 MSNs (projecting to the GPi/SNr) is enhanced 
by an increased responsibility signal, whereas the excitability of 
D2 MSNs (projecting to the GPe) is reduced. Such responsibil-
ity signals may be conveyed from striosomes to the surrounding 
matrix MSNs by striatal interneurons; we will examine potential 
mechanisms in the Section “Discussion.” The activity of each D1 
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Figure 6 | influences of input cortex and responsibility signaling on striatal 
matrix MSN activity in the network model. We model two neurons of the 
input region of the cortex, each representing information related to the value of 
action “a” or “b. ” These neurons project, respectively, to a D1 and a D2 matrix 
MSN in each of two modules in the striatum. (A) Cortical and striatal activity 
(arbitrary units) for simulation using only positive responsibility signals. The effect 
of positive responsibility signals is labeled “↑ DA, ” based on the possibility that 
they may involve an increase in phasic local striatal dopamine release (triggered 
by a decrease in local acetylcholine release). Responsibility is assigned to module 
B at time 50 and module A at time 200 (yellow boxes). Such responsibility 
signaling transiently increases D1 MSN activity and decreases D2 MSN activity. 
(B) Cortical and striatal activity for simulation using both positive and negative 
responsibility signals. The effect of negative responsibility signals is labeled “↑ 
ACh, ” based on the possibility that they may involve an increase in local striatal 
acetylcholine release. Positive responsibility is again assigned to module B at 
time 50 and module A at time 200 (yellow boxes). Additionally, negative 
responsibility is assigned to module A at time 50 and module B at time 200 (gray 
boxes). Negative responsibility signaling transiently increases D2 MSN activity.
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in the STN neurons becomes even coarser, because the projection 
from GPe to STN is also convergent. Consequently, neurons in the 
model STN preserve only the information regarding which module 
is more active (as a result of having been assigned higher responsi-
bility). Action-value information has been lost by virtue of the two 
pre-thalamic stages of convergence in the indirect pathway. Thus, 
in Figure 7E, the broad red peaks are higher for the modules to be 
selected but are too blurred to provide action-value information.
By contrast, both the module identity and the action values of 
the modules are preserved in the direct pathway, in which there 
is only one pre-thalamic stage (GPi/SNr; Figure 7D). For ease of 
illustrating the difference between the inputs from the two pathways 
to the GPi/SNr (Figure 7D), the input from the STN is delayed rela-
tive to that from the striatum by having a longer time constant, τ, 
of the response function in the STN. Thus the blue troughs, which 
are deeper for the actions to be selected, are followed by excitation. 
We used this time shift in our example solely to make it easier to see 
the different effects of the two inputs. Module and action selection 
occur in essentially the same way if we set the time constant of the 
STN to be the same as that of the other nuclei.
The net effect of the difference in degree of convergence assumed 
by the model thus results in the direct pathway maintaining action-
value information, whereas the indirect pathway can only represent 
the overall inhibition of modules. We illustrate the results of these 
differences for thalamic firing in Figure 7F. We have omitted the 
input from the neocortex to the thalamus in order to make clear the 
results of the different responsibility signals imposed in the stria-
tum, although we realize that this input is highly influential. Thus, 
the thalamic activity in the model is approximately the inverse of the 
GPi/SNr activity, and it can be regarded as a processed version of the 
striatal output to be sent to the cortex for the purpose of decision-
making. The thalamic activity consists of a transient enhancement 
of neuronal activity containing action-value information (due to 
the direct pathway) followed by suppression of neuronal activity 
in the unselected thalamic module (due to the indirect pathway).
As illustrated in Figure 5, each neuron in the output region of 
the neocortex receives excitatory inputs from the thalamus, from 
the input region of the neocortex, and from itself. In Figures 7G,I, 
the light blue peaks and dark blue troughs represent sub-threshold 
input. The persistent supra-threshold cortical activity (red) repre-
sents the final selection of an action and is evoked by the thalamic 
input (light blue peaks at time 50 and 200) and sustained by the 
cortical self-feedback projections. Modular suppression (dark blue 
troughs) is produced by the indirect pathway after time 50 (left 
module) and 200 (right module). The action selected at time 50 
is terminated by the modular suppression after time 200. At time 
200, the action in the other cortical module is selected, and it is 
continuously activated to the end. Thus, our model suggests that 
action selection promoted by the direct pathway may cooperate 
with modular suppression by the indirect pathway.
The parameters chosen here are within appropriate ranges in 
terms of physiological plausibility (e.g., firing rate and stability of 
each nucleus). Further, most of the results are robust to changes 
in these parameters. However, one simulation result, the sustained 
cortical activity observed in Figure 7G, was sensitive to changes 
in the firing threshold of the output cortex, because the sustained 
release resulting from a decrease in local acetylcholine release 
(see Discussion; Rice and Cragg, 2004; Cragg, 2006), their effect 
is labeled “↑ DA.”
Specifically, two neurons in the input region of the cortex, repre-
senting the values of two specific actions (“a” and “b”), are activated 
at times 50 and 200 (Figure 6A, left). The activity levels of these 
cortical neurons are 0.8 and 1.0. These neurons excite specific neu-
rons in the striatum (Figure 6A, middle and right; Figures 7A,B) 
and the output region of the cortex (Figure 7G). Corresponding 
module A and module B MSNs, and corresponding D1 and D2 
MSNs, all receive the same cortical input. Specifically, both the D1 
and the D2 MSNs having index numbers 54 and 99 (Module A, 
neurons “a” and “b” in Figure 6) receive the same cortical input 
at the same times, as do the D1 and the D2 MSNs having index 
numbers 205 and 249 (Module B, neurons “a” and “b” in Figure 6). 
Although in our model, for simplicity, corresponding D1 and D2 
MSNs receive identical cortical inputs, our modeling framework 
does not require that these inputs be identical or originate from 
the same cortical projection neuron. Thus, our model is consistent 
with the evidence that D1 and D2 MSNs receive their inputs from 
different types of layer 5 cortical pyramidal neuron (Lei et al., 2004; 
Reiner et al., 2010).
Module B has an increased responsibility at time 50 (Figure 6A, 
middle), and module A has an increased responsibility at time 
200 (Figure 6A, right). These increases in the responsibility sig-
nals are reflected in an increase in activity by 20% for D1 MSNs 
and a decrease in activity by 20% for D2 MSNs. Thus the action 
values represented by MSN activity are determined by the joint 
influence of the input cortex and the responsibility signals. The 
downstream results of these differential changes in responsibility 
signaling are illustrated in Figure 7 for the D1 and D2 MSNs in the 
two modules, together with corresponding sites in the basal ganglia 
striato-pallido-thalamo-cortical loop. In Figures 7A,B, the left two 
activity peaks at either time 50 or time 200 correspond to module 
A, neurons “a” and “b”; whereas the right two peaks correspond to 
module B, neurons “a” and “b” (cf. Figure 6A, middle and right). 
As a result of responsibility signaling, the D1 MSNs of module A 
are slightly more active at time 50 and slightly less active at time 
200, while the converse is true of the D2 MSNs. For each pair of 
activity peaks (which represents a modular pair of actions), the 
one on the right is greater, since the corresponding activity in the 
input cortex is greater.
Figures 7C–E contrast the activities in the direct- and indirect-
pathway nuclei. Note that the indirect-pathway projection from 
the striatum to the GPe is convergent, so that the information 
represented by each neuron in the GPe is coarser than that in the 
striatum. Further, because the projection from the striatum to the 
GPe mediated by the striatal D2 MSNs is inhibitory, the effect of 
responsibility on modules A and B in the GPe is the inverse of that 
on D2 MSNs in the striatum: the deepest blue trough in activity in 
module A (left two troughs) is deeper than that in module B (right 
two troughs) at time 50, and less deep at time 200. We emphasize 
that this effect is entirely the result of the inhibitory connections 
conveying information from the striatum: no additional respon-
sibility signals are added outside of the striatum. For each pair 
of activity troughs, the one on the right is deeper, since the cor-
responding activity in the striatum is greater.
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Figure 7 | Neuronal activity in structures of the cortico-basal ganglia-
thalamo-cortical network model. (A) Firing frequency of D1 MSNs in the 
striatum (n = 300). Color scale indicates firing frequency, x-axis indicates neuron 
index, and y-axis indicates time in arbitrary units. MSNs on the left (from x = 1 to 
150) are in module A and MSNs on the right (from x = 151 to 300) are in module B. 
Neuron “a” in the input region of the cortex (Figure 6A, left) projects to MSNs 54 
and 205, and neuron “b” projects to MSNs 99 and 249. (B) Firing frequency of D2 
MSNs (n = 300), which receive exactly the same pattern of connections from the 
input cortex as do D1 MSNs. (C) Firing frequency of GPe neurons (n = 100). 
Adjacent GPe neurons receive overlapping convergent inhibitory input from 
adjacent striatal D2 MSNs. As a result of this overlapping convergent connectivity, 
the focal striatal activity causes less focal GPe inhibition (i.e., the inhibition is spread 
or “blurred” over adjacent GPe neurons; blue troughs). (D) Firing frequency of GPi/
SNr neurons (n = 50), which receive convergent inhibitory input from striatal D1 
MSNs (blue troughs) and excitatory input from STN (red peaks). (e) Firing 
frequency of STN neurons (n = 25), which receive convergent inhibitory input from 
GPe (red peaks represent lowest inhibition). (F) Firing frequency of thalamic 
neurons (n = 200) in the simulation using only positive responsibility signals. (g) 
Membrane potential of neurons in the output region of the cortex (n = 200) in the 
simulation using only positive responsibility signals. Vertical red bars represent 
persistent supra-threshold cortical depolarization maintained by self-feedback 
connections. (H) Firing frequency of thalamic neurons (n = 200) in the simulation 
using both positive and negative responsibility signals. (i) Membrane potential of 
neurons in the output region of the cortex (n = 200) in the simulation using both 
positive and negative responsibility signals. The blue troughs observed in the 
thalamic and cortical activity are deeper in the simulation using both positive and 
negative responsibility signals. Note: in (A,B), we show only about one out of every 
six of the inactive MSNs, to make the active MSNs more visible in the figure.
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the parts of our models map onto the anatomical components of 
the basal ganglia. Despite these uncertainties, in the following sec-
tions, we discuss some of the key parallels between the models and 
features of the basal ganglia, in particular the modular organization 
of the striatum into striosomes and matrisomes, the evidence for 
error signals in striosomes, and the properties of striatal interneu-
rons that could be critical for communicating responsibility signals 
from striosomes to the surrounding extrastriosomal matrix.
strIatal modularIty as the basIs of modular reInforcement 
learnIng
The anatomical modularity of the striatum is a plausible substrate 
for a functional modularity of the kind expressed in our model 
(Figure 8). The two basic compartments of the striatum, strio-
somes, and matrix, are distinguished from each other on the basis of 
neurochemical markers, input and output connectivity with other 
brain structures and local connectivity (Graybiel and Ragsdale, 
1978; Herkenham and Pert, 1981; Gerfen, 1984; Gerfen et al., 1987; 
Bolam et al., 1988; Ragsdale and Graybiel, 1988; Gimenez-Amaya 
and Graybiel, 1990; Eblen and Graybiel, 1995; Graybiel, 1995; Holt 
et al., 1997; Joel and Weiner, 2000; Saka et al., 2002; Mikula et al., 
2009). The dendritic and axonal arborizations of the majority of 
MSNs are mostly, but not entirely, restricted to their compartment 
of origin (Penny et al., 1988; Kawaguchi et al., 1989; Walker et al., 
1993); and striatal interneurons also tend to follow striosome–
matrix divisions, notably with the cholinergic interneurons (puta-
tive tonically active neurons, TANs) and somatostatin-containing 
interneurons (putatively the LTS interneurons) tending to lie near 
the borders of striosomes, but having much of their arborizations 
in the matrix compartment (Graybiel et al., 1981, 1986; Gerfen, 
1984; Chesselet and Graybiel, 1986; Penny et al., 1988; Kawaguchi, 
1992; Aosaki et al., 1995; Kawaguchi et al., 1995; Kreitzer, 2009). 
Striosomes form a labyrinthine reticulum, as if to provide func-
tional coverage throughout the volume of the striatum (Graybiel 
and Ragsdale, 1978; Graybiel, 1984; Groves et al., 1988; Mikula et al., 
2009). Finally, the input and output connections of the matrix itself 
also have a modular organization in which inputs and outputs of the 
large matrix compartment are divided up into clustered domains 
called matrisomes (Gimenez-Amaya and Graybiel, 1991; Flaherty 
and Graybiel, 1994; Kincaid and Wilson, 1996; Parthasarathy and 
Graybiel, 1997). Thus, modularity appears to be a fundamental 
principle of the anatomical organization of the striatum.
We consider here that each striatal domain – module in our 
model – may consist of a striosome region and the adjacent matri-
somes (Figure 8). It is known that matrisomes receive convergent 
input from corresponding somatotopic representations in different 
cortical areas (e.g., primary motor and somatosensory cortices; 
Flaherty and Graybiel, 1993) and from closely related somato-
topic representations in the same cortical region (e.g., thumb and 
finger in the somatosensory cortex; Flaherty and Graybiel, 1991). 
Matrisomes also participate in a divergence–reconvergence archi-
tecture from cortex to striatum to GPe and GPi: corticostriatal pro-
jections diverge to multiple matrisomes, which then, at least in some 
instances, can send convergent projections to localized regions in 
the GPe and GPi (Flaherty and Graybiel, 1994). This architecture 
suggests that multiple matrisomes could participate in each striatal 
activity was supported by self-feedback projections and for some 
values of the firing threshold this activity was unstable. Since the 
detailed cortical mechanism that stabilizes this sustained activity 
is beyond the scope of this study, here we simply assume that the 
output cortex has some neuronal mechanism that stabilizes such 
activity and plays a role in selection and maintenance of the rep-
resentation of the selected action.
Network simulation with negative responsibility signals
It is possible that striatal modules also make use of negative respon-
sibility signals, i.e., signals that actively label a module as irrelevant 
to a given environmental context. This idea may have a basis in 
signaling by striatal interneurons, a possibility that we will examine 
in the Section “Discussion.”
In order to illustrate this possibility, we performed another simu-
lation, run as described above, but with the addition of a negative 
responsibility signal that enhances the activity of D2 MSNs in the 
unselected striatal module (Figure 6B). Based on the possibility 
that such negative responsibility signals may involve an increase 
in local striatal acetylcholine release (see Discussion; Ding et al., 
2010), their effect is labeled “↑ ACh.” At time 50, we apply a nega-
tive responsibility signal in striatal module A concurrently with the 
positive responsibility signal in module B; while at time 200, we 
apply a negative responsibility signal in striatal module B concur-
rently with the positive responsibility signal in module A. Figure 7H 
shows the thalamic activity induced by this simulation. Compared 
to the first simulation (Figure 7F), the broad troughs observed in 
the thalamic and cortical activity are much deeper, suggesting that 
the unselected module is more strongly suppressed.
These two network simulation results suggest that the direct 
pathway may bias actions based on action values and the indirect 
pathway may bias modules based on responsibility signals. These 
results emerge naturally from the simple combination of modular 
responsibility signaling in the striatum and differential blurring of 
action-value representations in the direct and indirect pathways. 
Based on these results, we hypothesize that the gating network of 
the RL architecture (Figure 1) corresponds to the indirect pathway 
of the basal ganglia circuitry.
dIscussIon
We have presented a pair of interrelated models: first, an abstract 
model of modular RL that embodies the critical idea that a modular 
architecture utilizing responsibility signals can facilitate learning 
and adapting to a changing environment; and second, a network 
model of cortico-basal ganglia-thalamo-cortical circuitry that 
embodies the novel idea that the indirect pathway could be cen-
tral to behavioral module selection based on responsibility signals, 
while the direct pathway could be central to action selection within 
a modular framework.
Our model of modular RL can be seen as both a set of abstract 
ideas concerning RL and a set of hypotheses regarding basal ganglia 
function. Regarding the latter component – the neural mechanisms 
underlying modular RL – the basal ganglia in general and the stria-
tum in particular have a number of key features that make them well 
suited to this type of modular learning based on prediction errors 
and responsibility signals. We emphasize, however, that experimen-
tal information is still insufficient to test definitively whether the 
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learning of state and action values; and (5) a module selection 
mechanism based on the responsibility signals. Assignment of 
responsibility to a striatal module could consist of an enhancement 
of excitability of neurons representing action values within the 
module and an enhancement of the plasticity of synapses convey-
ing state information to these action-value neurons. This plastic-
ity should also be modulated by the TD reward prediction error 
signal as in standard RL models of the striatum. Additionally, the 
plasticity of synapses conveying state information to prediction 
neurons should also be enhanced by the responsibility signal. We 
propose that basal ganglia-thalamo-cortical modules, containing 
striatal modules consisting of striosomes and associated matri-
somes, potentially meet all of these criteria.
Like others, we suggest that matrix MSNs may represent action 
values (Doya, 2000, 2002; Samejima et al., 2005). Action values 
in the model can refer to cognitive actions as well as movements: 
the associative striatum, which receives input from prefrontal and 
parietal association cortices, may more strongly influence the 
former, whereas the sensorimotor striatum, which receives input 
from sensorimotor cortices, may more strongly influence the lat-
ter (Graybiel, 1997, 2008). Also, like others, we suggest that stri-
osomes compute or relay prediction-related signals (Houk et al., 
1995; Doya, 2000, 2002).
However, unlike others, we assume that the prediction error 
signals of striosomes are specific to their respective modules and 
serve as the basis for modular responsibility and module selec-
tion signals. Further, modular RL requires modularity of learning 
modular domain, a situation that could allow multiple body parts 
to participate in actions regulated by the same context-specific 
modular responsibility signal. This hypothesis is a central and key 
aspect of our modeling framework. It has not yet been possible to 
support this hypothesis with direct electrophysiological or imaging 
evidence, due to formidable technical hurdles, but there are at least 
hints of functional modularity from two sources: early response 
gene assays that demonstrate that cortical microstimulation pro-
duces postsynaptic gene expression in focal zones corresponding 
anatomically to input matrisomes (Parthasarathy and Graybiel, 
1997); and documentation of focal zones of differential oscilla-
tory activity detected in local field potentials (Courtemanche et al., 
2003). We further hypothesize, again without compelling evidence 
but with reasonable assumptions, that corresponding basal ganglia-
thalamo-cortical modules may exist, consisting of striatal modular 
domains together with the corresponding modules of thalamic, 
subthalamic, and cortical regions (Alexander et al., 1986). By the 
same reasoning, we thus consider that the entire circuitry related 
to the striatum could have a modularity reflected by the striatal 
modules that have been demonstrated anatomically.
key characterIstIcs of reInforcement learnIng modules
In order to function as the modules in our model, these basal 
ganglia circuit modules would have to contain (1) neurons that 
predict future outcomes or other features of the environment; (2) 
responsibility signals based on prediction errors that indicate the 
appropriateness of the corresponding set of candidate actions to the 
current environmental context; (3) state- and action-value  signals; 
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Direct pathway 
promotes action
selection
Low Responsibility Module B Indirect pathway 
“gating network” 
suppresses behav-
ioral module
S
M
Figure 8 | Schematic summary of proposed effects of striatal responsibility 
signals on module and action selection. Top: If the sets of actions influenced 
by module A are appropriate to the environmental context, its striosome (S) 
assigns high responsibility by sending a signal to adjacent matrisomes (M) via 
local circuit interneurons. This results in relatively low activity in the indirect 
pathway and high activity in the direct pathway, which permits the direct pathway 
to promote selection of an action. Bottom: If the sets of actions influenced by 
module B are inappropriate to the environmental context, its striosome assigns 
low responsibility. This results in relatively high activity in the indirect pathway, 
which suppresses the associated set of candidate actions (behavioral module).
Amemori et al.  Striatum and modular reinforcement learning
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience  www.frontiersin.org  May 2011  | Volume 5  |  Article 47  |  13we have found that electrical microstimulation of the pACC 
can increase sensitivity to a prediction of an aversive outcome 
in monkeys making choices based on a combination of aversive 
and rewarding outcomes (Amemori and Graybiel, 2009, 2010). 
Therefore, the signal sent to striosomes in the caudate nucleus may 
be related to error detection and evaluation.
Our novel contribution here is the suggestion that striosomes 
may compute or convey prediction error signals as part of a broader 
role in generating responsibility signals based on the appropriate-
ness of particular modules to the environmental context. If this 
suggestion proves to be correct, then the context-relevant predic-
tions generated by striosomes could be much broader in scope than 
simple reward predictions. The prediction errors could include 
errors in the prediction of sensory cues (e.g., visual, tactile) or of 
other environmental features that signal context without being at 
the same time reliable predictors or cues for reward within that 
context. Determining whether striosomes contain such signals is 
an important goal for future experimental research.
modularIty of dopamIne sIgnals
In accordance with previous RL models of the basal ganglia, we 
assume that the TD error is represented by midbrain dopamine 
neurons and that action values are modified by dopamine-mediated 
synaptic plasticity in the striatum. However if, as our model suggests, 
striosomes and matrisomes are involved in the learning of funda-
mentally different things – the appropriate modular responsibility 
signals by striosomes, and the appropriate action values by matri-
somes – then one might expect them to receive different dopamine 
signals. The fact that, at least in part, different sets of dopamine 
neurons appear to project to striosomes and matrix in rats (Gerfen 
et al., 1987), cats (Jiménez-Castellanos and Graybiel, 1989), and 
monkeys (Langer and Graybiel, 1989) is consistent with the hypoth-
esis that dopamine release in striosomes conveys a separate signal 
from dopamine release in the matrix. Evidence from  single-cell trac-
ing in the rat suggests that there may be some separation also, but 
shows that collateral innervations are prominent as well, at least for 
the nigral axons studied (Matsuda et al., 2009). There is some evi-
dence that striosomes send reciprocal connections to the same nigral 
regions that innervate them, but this does not seem to be true for 
matrix neurons: in rats, the ventral-tier dopamine neurons (ventral 
SNc and SNr) are reported to receive inputs from the striosomes 
preferentially as well as from the limbic striatum, and to project 
reciprocally to striosomes; while the dorsal-tier dopamine neurons 
(including dorsal SNc and VTA) are reported to receive preferential 
inputs from the limbic striatum and project to the matrix (Joel and 
Weiner, 2000). More work is needed to analyze these connections 
in detail. Recent evidence from single-cell tracing supports the idea 
that striosome, but not matrix, neurons project to the SNc (as well 
as other sites; Fujiyama et al., 2011).
Matsumoto and Hikosaka (2009) have observed in monkeys 
that, although some SNc (putatively dopamine-containing) neu-
rons prefer reward-predicting stimuli to aversion-predicting stim-
uli, a large number of these neurons are excited by either of these 
types of stimulation. It is possible that these less-selective dopamine 
neurons correspond to the ventral-tier dopamine neurons in rats, 
and are reciprocally connected with striosomes – and that their 
less-selective responses reflect their function in learning to predict 
signals (Doya et al., 2002; Samejima et al., 2003). In modular RL, 
only the selected modules are responsible for the learning, and 
the updates of the predictions and action values have to occur 
only in the selected modules. For such local updating, the synaptic 
plasticity has to occur selectively in the selected modules. These 
features are key to our modular RL model. As introduced here, this 
model contains only two modules, and only one of them at a time 
is assigned high responsibility, but clearly, the striatum contains 
many modules. The modular RL framework we introduce here 
can readily be extended such that any number of related striatal 
modules can be concurrently assigned high responsibility, selected 
for action, and permitted to learn in a given context.
As can be seen in Figures 4E, F, one of the advantages of modular 
RL compared to normal RL is that the model can rapidly adapt to 
changes of environment after modular learning has been estab-
lished. Modular RL enables a module to learn a context-specific 
strategy or policy and recall this stored policy when it is required. 
The adaptive change of strategy by modular RL is much faster than 
normal RL. These fast adaptive changes of strategy are similar to 
attentional set-shifting and reversal learning. Parts of the prefrontal 
and anterior cingulate cortices and the caudate nucleus have been 
implicated in such shift learning (Rogers et al., 2000). These cortical 
and subcortical areas could therefore be candidates for producing 
signals used for learning to shift the modules in the striatum.
With regard to learning in a changing environment, it is of par-
ticular interest to compare modular RL with RL having an adjust-
able learning rate (Behrens et al., 2007; Bernacchia et al., 2011). We 
expect that modular RL can switch Q-functions rapidly compared 
to adjustable RL, which has to learn an appropriate Q-function de 
novo each time the environment changes. Modular RL does not 
have to learn a Q-function again after one has already been stored 
in a module. On the other hand, a disadvantage of modular RL is 
that it can have redundant parameters and Q-functions when the 
environment is less complex.
error and evaluatIon sIgnals sent to strIosomes
Our first and second criteria for RL modules, above, are that they 
should contain neurons that predict future rewards or other fea-
tures of the future state, and that they should use responsibility 
signals based on prediction errors. The idea that striosomes contain 
prediction-related signals is not new. Starting with the conceptual 
model of Houk et al. (1995), many models of the basal ganglia 
have assumed that striosomes compute a reward prediction or state 
value signal: just as action values may be learned via dopamine-
dependent synaptic plasticity at corticostriatal synapses onto matrix 
MSNs, reward predictions may be learned via dopamine-dependent 
synaptic plasticity at corticostriatal synapses onto striosomal MSNs. 
Moreover, even aside from this hypothetical mechanism for learn-
ing reward prediction, striosomes in the anterior and ventromedial 
striatum, mainly in the caudate nucleus, receive input from cortical 
areas that themselves exhibit error signals.
Anterograde tracing combined with neurochemical staining 
in monkeys suggests that the pregenual anterior cingulate cortex 
(pACC) and the posterior orbitofrontal cortex are important affer-
ents of striosomes in the caudate nucleus (Eblen and Graybiel, 
1995). Recordings from the pACC implicate it in error detection 
(Niki and Watanabe, 1979; Matsumoto et al., 2007). Importantly, 
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signal enhances the activation of direct-pathway (D1) MSNs and 
reduces the activation of indirect-pathway (D2) MSNs within a 
striatal module. What mechanism could underlie this effect? The 
results of Rice and Cragg (2004) suggest one possible mechanism: 
the TAN pause, acting as a positive responsibility signal, could 
transiently reduce the release of acetylcholine, thus reducing the 
activation of nAChRs on dopaminergic terminals. Given that the 
pause is time locked to the phasic activity of dopamine neurons, 
it is well timed to enhance the dopamine release. This relationship 
between cholinergic signaling and dopamine release can be related 
to studies in which behavioral and neural responses to dopamin-
ergic stimulation were altered following ablation of cholinergic 
interneurons, and in one study also somatostatinergic interneurons 
as well (Kaneko et al., 2000; Saka et al., 2002).
Consistent with our model, this enhanced dopamine release 
could potentially result in an enhancement of D1 MSN activity and 
a reduction in D2 MSN activity within a striatal module (Surmeier 
et al., 2010). There could be both a transient and a long-lasting com-
ponent of this effect: the transient component could come about via 
the opposing effects of dopamine on the excitability of D1 and D2 
MSNs, whereas the long-lasting component could come about as 
a result of the effect of dopamine on long-term synaptic plasticity. 
Since the TANs are widely but sparsely distributed in the striatum, 
this hypothetical gating function of TANs could allow the spatial 
regulation of dopamine-mediated synaptic plasticity, as required 
by TD learning within a modular RL framework.
The idea that the TAN pause could provide a window for plastic-
ity has been proposed previously (Graybiel et al., 1994; Aosaki et al., 
1995; Morris et al., 2004). Shen et al. (2008) found that activation of 
dopamine receptors is required for spike timing-dependent long-
term potentiation (LTP) at direct-pathway MSNs and long-term 
depression (LTD) at indirect-pathway MSNs (Surmeier et al., 2007; 
Shen et al., 2008). It is possible that the TAN pause permits opposing 
plasticity effects in order to enhance the disinhibition of actions by 
direct-pathway MSNs and to reduce the inhibition of actions by 
indirect-pathway MSNs (Surmeier et al., 2007). If our hypothesis 
is correct, then this plasticity can only happen in modules assigned 
responsibility by the TAN pause; such spatially selective learning is 
a critical requirement of modular RL.
In addition to its nAChR-mediated effects, acetylcholine has 
also been shown to influence corticostriatal synaptic plasticity via 
muscarinic acetylcholine receptors. Activation of M1 muscarinic 
receptors is required for LTP (Calabresi et al., 1999), whereas a 
reduction of M1 receptor activation can lead to LTD at corticos-
triatal synapses onto both direct- and indirect-pathway MSNs by 
disinhibiting Cav1.3 Ca2+ channels (Wang et al., 2006). By contrast, 
activation of M2 muscarinic receptors reduces corticostriatal LTP 
(Calabresi et al., 1998). These plasticity effects could also play a 
role in long-term changes in modular responsibility assignment. A 
pause in acetylcholine release may also be capable of depolarizing 
MSNs or enhancing their excitability via effects at acetylcholine 
receptors on MSNs themselves (Hsu et al., 1996; Galarraga et al., 
1999), on GABAergic interneurons inhibiting MSNs (Koós and 
Tepper, 2002), on glutamatergic terminals (Pakhotin and Bracci, 
2007), on dopaminergic terminals (Zhou et al., 2001; Rice and 
Cragg, 2004), or on different combinations of these. Excitation of 
salient features of specific environmental contexts, as required by 
our model. Thus it is possible that the dorsal-tier dopamine neu-
rons, and the corresponding neurons in monkeys, represent reward 
prediction error (TD error, δ), whereas ventral-tier dopamine neu-
rons represent stimulus saliency or surprise, which may be closely 
related to environmental feature prediction errors (∆).
potentIal functIons of strIatal Interneurons In 
responsIbIlIty sIgnalIng
The function of responsibility signals in our models is to promote 
the selection of modules for learning and action selection. In our RL 
model, responsibility signals are based on errors in the prediction of 
features of the environment; after training, they reflect the appropri-
ateness of behavioral modules to specific environmental contexts. So 
far, we have discussed the possibility that striosomes, together with 
their cortical afferents and reciprocally connected dopamine neu-
rons, may learn to generate such environmental feature prediction 
errors, which could then form the basis of modular responsibility 
signals. We now turn to the question of how such responsibility 
signals could be communicated from striosomes to matrisomes.
Both cholinergic and LTS interneurons send processes into both 
compartments and may send axons preferentially into the matrix 
(Gerfen, 1984; Chesselet and Graybiel, 1986; Graybiel et al., 1986; 
Kawaguchi, 1992; Kawaguchi et al., 1995; Kreitzer, 2009). We have 
noted evidence above that these interneurons tend often to lie at 
the edges of striosomes, and that much of both the cholinergic 
neuropil and the somatostatinergic neuropil is concentrated in the 
matrix. The evidence is not sufficient for strong conclusions, but 
from these results these interneuron types are plausible candidates 
for conveying responsibility signals from striosomes to the sur-
rounding matrix.
By far the better characterized of these two are the cholinergic 
interneurons, which are thought to correspond, largely, to the striatal 
neurons physiologically characterized in vivo as having tonic activity 
in awake behaving primates (Kimura et al., 1984) – the so-called 
TANs. TANs show a characteristic pause in their spontaneous activ-
ity (usually followed, and sometimes preceded, by a phasic increase 
in activity) in response to salient stimuli, unexpected rewards, and 
predictors of reward (Aosaki et al., 1994a, 1995; Apicella, 2007). This 
response requires striatal dopamine (Aosaki et al., 1994a), is time 
locked to phasic activity of midbrain dopamine neurons (Morris 
et al., 2004), and it can be sensitive to context (Apicella, 2007). Such 
a pause could serve to assign responsibility to striatal modules at 
precisely the time at which phasic dopamine release occurs in the 
striatum, which is the time at which dopamine-dependent long-
term synaptic plasticity may occur. How could this work, and how 
would this be related to striosomes as the original calculator of 
responsibility signals?
There are a few mechanisms by which assignment of responsi-
bility by TANs could potentially occur. Perhaps most intriguingly, 
decreased activation of nicotinic acetylcholine receptors (nAChRs) 
on dopaminergic terminals in the striatum modulates dopamine 
release in a frequency-dependent manner: dopamine release due 
to high-frequency local stimulation in striatal slices (correspond-
ing, perhaps, to phasic activity of midbrain dopamine neurons) is 
enhanced, whereas that due to low-frequency local stimulation is 
reduced (Rice and Cragg, 2004; Cragg, 2006).
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TAN response may play the role of graded responsibility assign-
ment. Another possibility is that the sign of the selection signal is 
reversed and the TAN pause is a de-selection signal. For example, 
Wilson (2004) suggested that the phasic increase in activity preced-
ing the pause in a relatively small set of TANs could lead to LTP at 
corticostriatal synapses onto associated MSNs, whereas the pause 
occurring by itself in a larger set of TANs could lead to LTD. Within 
the framework of our models, the smaller set of MSNs could cor-
respond to modules assigned high responsibility, and the larger set 
could correspond to modules assigned low responsibility.
negatIve responsIbIlIty sIgnals
In one version of our network model, we assumed that responsi-
bility signals could take on negative values in order to signal inap-
propriateness of modules to a given environmental context. Such 
negative responsibility signals would increase the excitability of 
indirect-pathway MSNs. The combination of positive responsibility 
signals indicating appropriateness of a given module and negative 
responsibility signals indicating inappropriateness of surrounding 
modules might not only enhance the contrasts between modules 
but also help to limit the spatial extent of responsibility signaling 
via a surround inhibition-like mechanism.
The results of Ding et al. (2010) suggest a partial physiologi-
cal basis for negative responsibility signaling: they found that a 
brief thalamostriatal excitation of cholinergic interneurons in 
slices results in an enhancement of the responsiveness of indirect-
pathway MSNs lasting for about a second. This effect is mediated by 
M1 muscarinic receptors. In the model, such an indirect-pathway 
enhancement within a striatal module is the result of a negative 
responsibility signal and enhances the suppression of the set of 
actions controlled by the corresponding basal ganglia-thalamo-
cortical module. Thus, while decreased cholinergic activity may 
signal enhanced appropriateness of modules to the context, it is 
possible that increased cholinergic activity can signal decreased 
appropriateness.
Finally, we reiterate that the cellular architecture of the striatum 
is still incompletely analyzed, so that our assignment of particular 
elements of striatal circuits to the modules of our model almost 
certainly will be revised and changed. Nevertheless, we emphasize 
that applying the computational ideas of responsibility signals 
and modular RL to the so far known organization of the striatum 
seems already appropriate and, as we have outlined above, produces 
a novel way to move naturally from consideration of the clearly 
modular anatomical architecture of the striatum to the concept 
of basal ganglia outputs as being divided into the known direct 
and indirect pathways.
comparIson to other work
A number of authors have previously made proposals that contain 
elements of our models, but to our knowledge, our models are the 
first to provide a unified framework based on striosome– matrisome 
modules, in which striosomes assign responsibility on the basis of 
environmental context prediction errors, and in which interneu-
rons convey these responsibility signals from striosomes to associ-
ated matrisomes. Although the view that the indirect pathway may 
suppress inappropriate actions is widely held, our network model is 
cholinergic interneurons by stimulating thalamostriatal axons in 
slices leads to a transient M2 receptor-mediated suppression of exci-
tatory input to MSNs followed by a slower, M1 receptor-mediated 
facilitation of postsynaptic excitability in indirect-pathway MSNs 
(Ding et al., 2010).
Although the TAN pause is not the only signal by which interneu-
rons could convey responsibility from striosomes to matrix, the 
suggestion that the TAN pause is a responsibility signal originat-
ing in striosomes implies that striosomes participate in generating 
this pause. However, the involvement of striosomes in generating 
the pause has not yet been established. We first review the well- 
established factors in pause generation and then examine the possi-
bility that striosomal MSNs may also contribute to pause generation.
The acquisition and expression of the pause response is known 
to require input from the centromedian–parafascicular (CM–Pf) 
complex of the thalamus (Lapper and Bolam, 1992; Matsumoto 
et al., 2001) and from dopamine-containing nigrostriatal neurons 
(Aosaki et al., 1994a; Watanabe and Kimura, 1998). Although one 
proposed mechanism for TAN pause generation involves an intrin-
sic afterhyperpolarization following depolarization (Reynolds et al., 
2004; Wilson and Goldberg, 2006), inhibitory input from MSNs 
could also contribute to generating the pause (Bolam et al., 1986; 
Watanabe and Kimura, 1998).
Given the pattern of arborization and concentration of TANs 
near borders of striosomes observed in primates (Aosaki et al., 
1995), it seems likely that signals from striosomes contribute in 
some way to the pattern of TAN activity: signaling from striosomal 
MSNs to TANs could occur via substance P, enkephalin, and/or 
GABA (Bolam et al., 1986; Kaneko et al., 1993; Le Moine et al., 1994; 
Lee et al., 1997; Yan et al., 1997; Jabourian et al., 2005). Cholinergic 
interneurons express GABAA receptors, and disynaptic GABAergic 
IPSPs evoked in cholinergic interneurons by stimulation of cor-
ticostriatal and thalamostriatal fibers show dopamine-dependent 
LTP, a possible mechanism for acquisition of the pause response 
(Yan et al., 1997; Suzuki et al., 2001). Intriguingly, substance P is 
highly expressed in striosomes, and a high density of both substance 
P-containing fibers and substance P receptor-containing somata 
and dendrites overlaps at the borders of striosomes (Jakab et al., 
1996). Importantly, not only cholinergic but also somatostatinergic 
interneurons contain substance P receptors (Kaneko et al., 1993; 
Aubry et al., 1994). Striosomal MSNs are themselves influenced by 
endogenous ligands of μ-opioid receptors (e.g., enkephalin). Miura 
et al. (2007, 2008) found that a μ-opioid receptor agonist decreased 
the amplitude of IPSPs in striosomal, but not matrix, MSNs via a 
presynaptic mechanism.
Additionally, it is possible that some TANs (particularly those 
within or near the borders of striosomes) receive input from the 
same dopamine neurons that appear to be reciprocally innervated 
by striosomal MSNs (Gerfen et al., 1987; Joel and Weiner, 2000); 
this is another potential pathway by which striosomes could influ-
ence the pause.
Given that the number of TANs exhibiting a pause response 
increases over the course of learning until they comprise the major-
ity (50–70%) of TANs (Aosaki et al., 1994b), it is possible is that for 
each environment or context, many striatal modules at a time are 
assigned responsibility in a graded, rather than an all-or-none, man-
ner. The environment would then dictate the pattern of   modular 
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